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Theses
The collapse of the Soviet bloc’s structures (the Council of Mutual 
Economic Assistance and the Warsaw Pact) and then of the Soviet 
Union itself in 1989–1991 was a kind of geopolitical earthquake in 
Europe. The main political and legal successor of the USSR, the 
Russian Federation, had to determine its place in the European 
order that was being formed, including the security sphere. 
The new Russia, which inherited from the USSR its membership 
in the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) 
and the newly established North Atlantic Co-operation Council 
(NACC), declared its attachment to European democratic values, 
suggesting that it was ready to embark on close co-operation and, 
at some point in the future, even join the European and Euro-
Atlantic security structures (including NATO) that had been 
formed during the Cold War era in opposition to the USSR. 
However, Russia’s Soviet legacy also included elements of its stra-
tegic culture, political concepts and a significant share of person-
nel whose views had already been formed. This, in turn, meant that 
both the will and ability of Russia’s most senior state authorities to 
put these declarations into practice were highly uncertain. Even 
though, due to the economic crisis and process of disintegration, 
Russia turned out to be weaker than the USSR in the 1970s and 1980s, 
it did not relinquish either its status as a powerful state or the related 
idea – viewed in maximalist terms – of political sovereignty (even 
from the West). The government elites of the Russian Federation 
(like the last Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev and his aides before 
them) wanted to create a new security architecture in Europe. If 
constructed according to Moscow’s concepts such an architecture 
would lead to marginalisation or disbanding of the existing West-
ern security structures (especially NATO) and curbing the US pres-
ence and influence in Europe. Above all, it would ensure Moscow’s 
de facto participation in the decision-making processes concerning 
European security. In addition, Russia did not wish to relinquish 
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its objective of maintaining its zone of influence in the post-Soviet 
area (temporarily excluding the Baltic states). It was ready to use 
military force to foment and capitalise on political and ethnic con-
flicts in this area to achieve this goal. It also launched a political 
campaign to counter the efforts of Central European countries – the 
former (involuntary) participants of the Soviet bloc – to join NATO, 
attempting to create a more or less formal buffer zone in this region. 
The overriding goals of Russia’s European security policy have 
remained unaltered, regardless of the various initiatives taken by 
Moscow: strategic control of the post-Soviet area, the existence of 
a security buffer zone in Central Europe and the transformation 
of the existing NATO-based security system in Europe in a man-
ner that would maximise Russia’s political and security influence 
and minimise that of the USA. 
What has changed and been diversified are the institutional solu-
tions Moscow has employed in an attempt to achieve these goals: 
basing European security on the OSCE (predominant in its pol-
icy in the 1990s) or as part of a special partnership with NATO 
(mainly in the first decade of the 2000s) or through attempts to 
use the European Security and Defence Policy to enhance security 
co-operation with the EU. 
Over time, the Kremlin’s ambitions were gradually curtailed after Rus-
sian foreign policy had suffered further defeats. When it was launch-
ing the campaign against NATO enlargement eastwards, Moscow ini-
tially concentrated its efforts on the Visegrad Group countries, then 
on the Baltic states and finally, as the enlargement process continued, 
on Ukraine and Georgia. Initially, the security buffer zone in Central 
Europe was intended to separate the areas of NATO and Russia (and 
other CIS countries). However, when this proved impossible, it was to 
be established inside NATO on its eastern flank. 
From today’s perspective, it can be concluded that none of the 
strategic goals of Russia’s European security policy have been 
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achieved. Even through Russia has created economic, political and 
security structures controlled by it in the post-Soviet area, their 
range, effectiveness and scale of real control of the member states’ 
policy is far from meeting Russian expectations. The NATO–Rus-
sia Founding Act, which imposes quite imprecise restrictions on 
the deployment of the Allied forces on NATO’s eastern flank, albeit 
politically dead, is still formally respected by NATO. However, the 
regular reinforcement of the Allied (and bilaterally US) military 
presence on the eastern flank – formally as part of the so-called 
‘regular rotation’ – undermines the buffer zone idea. Regardless 
of discussions that recur from time to time, Russia has also been 
unable to create any European security system as an alternative 
to the existing one, especially a system that would offer Moscow 
veto power. 
Furthermore, the aggressive and revisionist foreign policy that 
has been sustained since the second half of the 2010s on President 
Vladimir Putin’s initiative has led to a crisis in relations with the 
West, in some respects even more serious than the one that pre-
vailed during the Cold War era. The causes of this include: Rus-
sia’s de facto withdrawal from the Treaty on Conventional Armed 
Forces in Europe (CFE) regime; undermining the system of meas-
ures for building trust and security in Europe (blocking further 
adaptation of the Vienna Document and violations of the Treaty 
on Open Skies); the erosion of the system of nuclear weapons con-
trol, provoked by Russia due to violating the INF treaty and, most 
importantly, Russia’s acts of military aggression in Europe (in 
2008 against Georgia and in 2014 against Ukraine), involving real 
territorial annexations and Russia’s numerous military provoca-
tions and ‘hybrid’ actions against NATO member states and non-
aligned countries. 
At present, Russia needs to choose: whether it should continue 
the present confrontational approach in its European security 
policy or even toughen it, thus taking the risk of increasing politi-
cal, economic and security costs, or seek détente with the West, 
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probably at the expense of certain concessions (including those 
as part of the Minsk process covering the conflict with Ukraine in 
Donbass), and by starting once more to honour at least some of the 
agreements concerning European security. 
Moscow’s decisions may be affected by a number of factors. The 
most essential of these seem to be the factors linked to the domes-
tic situation in Russia, possible personnel changes inside the Rus-
sian government and an evolution of the perception and under-
standing of the international and regional situation by the Rus-
sian government. The present aggressive policy pursued by Russia 
seems incapable of being altered without major changes in these 
areas. 
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InTroducTIon
1989 marked the beginning of a short but intense period of thor-
ough geopolitical changes in the eastern part of Europe. The simul-
taneous weakening and liberalisation of the communist regime 
in the USSR led by Mikhail Gorbachev, the gradual limitation of 
Moscow’s economic and political support but also its shrinking 
control over the countries in the Soviet bloc and domestic political 
crises inside these countries led to a rapid downfall of the com-
munist governments in Central-Eastern Europe. The military, 
economic and political structures of the Soviet bloc were dis-
solved within a timeframe of just two years1, and the Soviet Union 
itself ceased to exist in December 1991, to be replaced with fifteen 
new independent states. The Russian Federation became the main 
successor to the USSR as it, albeit seriously weakened, inherited 
a large section of the Soviet empire’s resources and had to redefine 
its interests in the new post-Cold War European and global order 
that was being formed. 
In the 1990s, during the presidency of Boris Yeltsin, troubled by 
domestic crises and involved in conflicts in the post-Soviet area, 
Russia was attempting to find a modus vivendi with Western states 
and structures and to create a new model of European secu-
rity architecture that would suit it. In turn, in the 2000s, after 
Vladimir Putin took power, the manner of governing the coun-
try gradually became more and more authoritarian and Russia 
became increasingly assertive in its foreign policy. Russia’s con-
flict with the West has been escalating since the middle of the 
first decade of the 21st century. As Moscow gained strength due 
to the boom in the energy markets, it became ever more ready 
and willing to use the armed forces as an instrument of its policy. 
1 The Council of Mutual Economic Assistance (Comecon, an economic integra-
tion structure of the Soviet bloc) was self-dissolved in June 1991. In February 
1991, member states of the Warsaw Pact (a military bloc formed by the USSR 
established in 1955) decided to disband its military structures, and in July 
1991 to dissolve it completely. 
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The Russian aggression against Ukraine and the occupation of 
Crimea and a part of Donbass provoked the most serious crisis in 
Russian-Western relations since the end of the Cold War, which 
remains unresolved to this day. 
On the thirtieth anniversary of the dramatic developments of 1989 
which changed Europe, it is worthwhile to sum up this period in 
regard to Russia’s European security policy also, and to pose the 
following questions: 
 – What were and what are Russia’s strategic goals in this area?
 – Has Russian policy changed and, if so, to what extent? 
 – What has Russia managed to achieve?
 – What kind of policy is Russia likely to adopt in the sphere of 
European security? 
This text is a modest attempt to answer the questions presented 
above and a voice to add to the discussion concerning Russian pol-
icy, which poses a serious challenge to Europe, including Poland. 
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I. does russIa have a sTraTegy?
In discussions concerning Russia’s policy, including security pol-
icy, the following question is often asked: does contemporary Rus-
sia have a political strategy and a precise comprehensive plan to 
implement it or is its policy reactive and opportunistic, based on 
a variety of tactics, while it attempts to achieve what seems pos-
sible at a given moment?2  
Apparently, the truth lies somewhere in between: the small gov-
ernment circle focused around President Vladimir Putin guided 
primarily by their personal interests most likely does not have 
a long-term and precise plan of attaining political goals, includ-
ing in foreign and security policy. However, it does have a vision 
of the optimal state of affairs which should be pursued and from 
which the general strategic goals originate; it has a vision based 
on a particular perception of the world and strategic culture. The 
flexible tactics are subordinated to the implementation of these 
goals. The Russian political elite, responding to the changing cir-
cumstances and employing the centralised authoritarian govern-
ance system which makes it possible to quickly make or change 
decisions without the need to take into account the views of other 
political circles or public opinion, is able to skilfully use various 
occasions as they arise and so-called ‘windows of opportunity’. 
At the same time, the authoritarian government model, the compo-
sition of the government team among which former secret service 
officers predominate3 and restrictions in public debate that also 
2 This issue has been raised, e.g. by A. Monaghan, ’Putin’s Russia: shaping 
a ‘grand strategy’?’, International Affairs 2013 (September), vol. 89, issue 5; 
A. Kolesnikov, ’The Russian Regime in 2015: All Tactics, No Strategy’, Car-
negie Moscow Center, 9 September 2015; P.B. Doran, D.N. Jensen, ‘Putin’s 
Strategy of Chaos’, The American Interest, 1 March 2018; M. Kofmann, ’Raiding 
and International Brigandy. Russia’s Strategy for Great Power Competition’, 
War on the Rocks, 14 June 2018. 
3 For more detail see: Putin for the fourth time. The state of and prospects for Russia 
(2018–2024), [series: “OSW Reports”], Warsaw 2018. 
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concern foreign and security policy frequently result in erroneous 
judgements, failures and, as a consequence, even outcomes which 
are the opposite to what was desired. This is especially evident in 
the area of European security in the broad meaning of the term.
So how can Russia’s goals in its European security policy be deter-
mined? Analysing almost 30 years of Russian policy in this area, 
four such general goals of geopolitical and geostrategic nature can 
be distinguished: 
1.	 Strategic control of the post-Soviet area (temporarily exclud-
ing the Baltic states)
2.	 Creating a security buffer zone in Central Europe
3.	 Minimising the US influence and presence in Europe
4.	 Maximising Russia’s influence in Europe
All of these goals are interlinked; the last two in particular may be 
viewed as ‘coupled’. So how should these goals be understood and 
what are the signs that the Russian government elite is making 
efforts to achieve them? 
1. Strategic control of the post-Soviet area 
(temporarily excluding the Baltic states) 
This goal needs to be understood as Russia’s desire to influence 
the foreign, security and domestic policies of most of the post-
Soviet states (especially Belarus, Ukraine and Kazakhstan, which 
are perceived in Moscow as the key countries), setting them on 
a track that suits the interests defined by Moscow. This means, 
in particular, that these countries could not enter into politi-
cal and military alliances and economic integration agreements 
that are recognised by Russia as hostile or competitive (above 
all the structures formed by the West) or develop close bilateral 
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co-operation, in particular, in the area of security, with leading 
Western countries (most notably the USA). At the same time, 
these countries would participate in similar structures controlled 
by Moscow and adopt a policy of the closest possible friendly co-
operation with Russia4. These goals were specified directly in Rus-
sia’s strategic course in its relations with the States-Participants of the 
Commonwealth of Independent States, adopted in September 1995: 
CIS member states should be obliged to refrain from participat-
ing in unfriendly5 alliances and blocs, and the entire CIS area was 
recognised as a ‘Russian zone of influence’6. 
In the final years of the USSR’s existence, the economic and then 
political liberalisation initiated by the then Secretary General of 
4 This kind of Russian approach is illustrated, for example, in Russian definitions 
of ‘good neighbourly relations’. One of them was used in 1992 by the then chair-
man of the Russian Parliamentary Commission for Foreign Affairs, Vladimir 
Lukin: “The democratic Russia does not fear sovereignty and independence of its 
new neighbours (…). It does not intend to impose its government system on them 
or interfere with their internal affairs in any other manner. However, it does 
have the right to expect them to unconditionally respect human and civil rights 
of the Russian-speaking population living there (…). It also has the right to ex-
pect them to refrain from making any moves that are hostile towards Russia and 
not to admit third countries’ activity in their territory that would pose a threat 
to Russian security, and is ready to offer any assistance to its neighbours to pro-
tect their own security in bilateral and multilateral forms.” V. Lukin’s speech 
during a seminar on Russia’s foreign policy towards the ‘closer abroad’, Mos-
cow, 6 October 1992, ‘Внешнеполитическая стратегия России в „ближнем” 
зарубежье’, Дипломатический Вестник 1992 (November), nos. 21–22. The Min-
ister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, Sergey Lavrov, made a refer-
ence to the same approach in his speech in the Russian State Duma in November 
2014: “Each state has a sovereign right to choose its economic partners on condi-
tion that this does not infringe upon legitimate interests of its neighbours.” See 
‘Bыступление и ответы на вопросы Министра иностранных дел России 
С.В. Лаврова в рамках «правительственного часа» в Государственной Думе 
Федерального Собрания Российской Федерации’, 19 November 2014. 
5 Implicitly: towards Russia.
6 Cтратегический курс России с государствами-участниками Содружества 
Независимых Государств, Утвержден Указом Президента Российской 
Федерации от 14 сентября 1995 г. № 940. Although the term ‘unfriendly alli-
ances and blocs’ has not been defined, it could be clearly concluded from the 
context of the then Russian political rhetoric that this concerned above all 
the USA and NATO. 
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the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union 
(and from 1990 also president of the USSR), Mikhail Gorbachev, 
unleashed numerous tensions and conflicts which had been frozen 
and which were latent at the intra-republic and inter-republic lev-
els. A clear majority of the republics demanded more and more inde-
pendence from the Moscow-based centre. This process gradually 
turned into a ‘sovereignty parade’: the republics, one after another, 
would proclaim declarations of sovereignty, and some of them (like 
the Baltic states and Georgia) even declarations of independence. 
The Soviet government’s reaction was chaotic and involved 
a whole array of actions: from the use of violence (as in Lithuania, 
Latvia, Georgia and Azerbaijan) through to negotiations. The most 
far-reaching initiative was the attempt made by Gorbachev and 
his aides to adopt a new union agreement that would lay the legal 
foundations for a ‘renewed’ USSR, functioning under a changed 
name. This neo-USSR would to a great extent preserve the bonds 
between the republics in key areas. Subsequent variants of the 
agreement (the draft version of 1990 resembling a loose federation 
model and the one from 1991 envisaging a model more inclined 
towards a confederation) provided, amongst other things, for 
maintaining unitary armed forces and for conducting a common 
foreign and security policy. Even though these attempts were 
unsuccessful (the process of disintegration within the USSR sud-
denly accelerated after the so-called ‘Moscow coup’ in August 
1991), they still manifested the desire to maintain a uniform stra-
tegic space within the boundaries of the former USSR.  
The political ambitions of the leader of the RSFSR, Boris Yeltsin, 
led to him coming into conflict with Gorbachev and the Moscow-
based centre under the slogan of ‘sovereignisation’ of the Soviet 
republics7. After the Moscow coup d’état, he took the politi-
cal initiative and led the process to signing an accord between 
7 For more detail see: W. Marciniak, Rozgrabione imperium. Upadek Związku 
Sowieckiego i powstanie Federacji Rosyjskiej, Warszawa 2001.
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Russia, Belarus and Ukraine in December 1991 at a villa in Viskuli, 
Belavezhskaya Pushcha National Park, setting up the Common-
wealth of Independent States known as CIS (which was joined by 
eight other republics two weeks later – the exceptions being the 
Baltic states and Georgia). This accord put an end to the USSR (the 
declaration that the USSR as a geopolitical entity ceased to exist 
and the provisions on foreign policy coordination were particu-
larly important); agreements concerning, amongst other issues, 
common armed forces and control of the strategic nuclear arsenal 
were signed within two weeks or so8.  
However, it turned out to be impossible to maintain a common 
strategic space encompassing the CIS area. The Soviet Army was 
the first to disintegrate; political control of its units was gradually 
taken over by the governments of the individual republics. This 
happened partly due to the stance taken by Russia, which eventu-
ally in May 1992 decided to form its own armed forces. Similarly, 
other goals of defence policy have not been achieved to a signifi-
cant extent as part of the CIS: 
 – building a common protection of the ‘external borders’ (i.e. in 
fact a border of the former USSR) – by the end of the 1990s, 
Russian soldiers were forced to withdraw from the ‘external’ 
borders of all CIS countries (except for Armenia);
 – creating ‘joint CIS peacekeeping forces’ – the only essen-
tial example of the short collaboration in this area was the 
8 See Соглашение о создании Содружества Независимых Государств; 
Соглашение о совместных мерах в отношении ядерного оружия; Соглашение 
между государствами – участниками Содружества Независимых Госу-
дарств по Стратегическим cилам; Соглашение между государствами 
– участниками Содружества Независимых Государств о статусе Стра-
тегических сил; Соглашение между Республикой Армения, Республикой 
Беларусь, Республикой Казахстан, Республикой Кыргызстан, Российской 
Федерацией, Республикой Таджикистан, Туркменистаном и Республикой 
Узбекистан о Силах общего назначения на переходный период; Соглашение 
об Объединенных Вооруженных Силах на переходный период. 
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participation of Kazakh and Kyrgyz companies in the ‘peace-
keeping forces’ dominated by Russian units in Tajikistan in 
the early 1990s; the troops which used this name before, and 
which have been stationed to this day in Georgian Abkhazia, 
consist exclusively of Russian soldiers;
 – creating a common CIS air defence system – the only fully 
functional element of this system is co-operation between 
Russia and Belarus (this system also functions to a limited 
extent in the case of Armenia, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan).
The agreements signed in December 1991 concerning joint control 
by four countries (Russia, Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan) of 
the post-Soviet strategic nuclear arsenal remained on paper – 
operational control was maintained by Russia, and the process 
of withdrawing strategic missiles with nuclear warheads from 
other countries to Russia in order to destroy them ended in 1996. 
At the same time, as early as the spring of 1992 Russia made an 
attempt to organise the post-Soviet area as regards security 
according to new rules. The main manifestation of this was the 
signing of the Collective Security Treaty on Russia’s initiative in 
May 1992 in Tashkent (its provisions suggested that this was more 
of a defensive alliance) by Russia, Armenia, Kazakhstan, Kyr-
gyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan9, which was joined by Belarus 
(from 1994) and temporarily by Georgia (1993–1999) and Azerbai-
jan (1993–1999). The overriding goal of this agreement, from the 
viewpoint of Moscow’s interests, was a form of deal: in return for 
political loyalty and refraining from entering into alliance with 
the USA and NATO, the member states were offered security 
guarantees by Russia, opportunities to train officers at Russian 
military universities and promises to supply weapons and other 
military equipment at preferential prices. 
9 Uzbekistan withdrew from this deal in 1999 to re-join it in 2006 and with-
draw from it again in 2012. 
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However, the Tashkent Treaty remained a loose and mostly politi-
cal structure, and its functioning was restricted to regular offi-
cial meetings and military exercises on a limited scale. It was 
only after Vladimir Putin took power that this treaty began to be 
institutionalised in the 2000s. In September 2003, the agreement 
establishing the Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO, 
Russian ОДКБ), which had been signed a year before, came into 
force. The political and personnel structures of the Treaty were 
formed on the grounds of this agreement, and the CSTO Collec-
tive Rapid Reaction Forces were created in 2009. These moves 
were intended to give the impression that a structure analogous 
to NATO was being formed that could be both a partner and an 
opponent to the Alliance. Russia’s political, personnel and mili-
tary dominance in this structure, the limited scale of military 
integration and operational co-operation do not make it similar to 
NATO but rather turn it into one of the tools of Russian hegemony 
in the post-Soviet area10. 
The processes of military integration with Russia are the most 
advanced in the case of Belarus, where joint forces and an inte-
grated air defence system were established. However, the CSTO 
did not become a collective security system. It played virtually 
no role in settling conflicts in the post-Soviet area in which Rus-
sia was generally involved as both a party and a formal arbiter 
(armed forces of the Russian Federation were engaged in the 1990s 
in the civil war in Tajikistan and in the Georgia-Ossetia, Georgia-
Abkhazia and Moldova-Transnistria conflicts). Troops operating 
under the aegis of the treaty did not intervene even when they 
were expressly asked for help (Kyrgyzstan asked for it during the 
Kyrgyz-Uzbek ethnic conflict in summer 2010). 
10 For more detail see: J. Norberg, High Ambitions, Harsh Realities. Gradually 
Building the CSTO’s Capacity for Military Intervention in Crises, FOI, Stockholm 
2013; R. Weitz, ‘The Collective Security Treaty Organization: Past Struggles 
and Future Prospects’, Russian Analytical Digest, 21 July 2014, No. 152.
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Table 1. Russian military engagement in external conflicts in the 
post-Soviet area in the 1990s. 
Country Period Character	of	Russia’s	engagement
Moldova 1990–1992
weapon supplies and direct military 
support (14th Army) provided to Trans-
nistrian separatists against Moldovan 
government troops, deployment of so-
called ‘peacekeeping forces’
Tajikistan 1991–1992/1996
weapon supplies and direct military 
support (201st Mechanised Division) 
provided to the post-communist govern-
ment and the Popular Front against 
the Islamic opposition, deployment of 
so-called ‘peacekeeping forces’ 
Georgia 1992–1993
weapon supplies, undercover engage-
ment of Russian officers, soldiers and 
air forces on the side of Abkhazian and 
Ossetian separatists attacking Georgian 
troops, deployment of so-called ‘peace-
keeping forces’
The conflicts specified above can be branded as post-colonial: they 
were to a great extent a result of the collapse of the USSR, while 
Russia was trying to control this process and mitigate its conse-
quences. In turn, the nature of the Russian-Georgian five-day war 
in August 2008 was completely different, since it can be recog-
nised as the first Russian ‘counter-offensive’ war: Russia decided 
to wage it with the intention of blocking the process of violating 
the Russian zone of influence by the West – the very same zone, to 
be clear, that had been unilaterally defined by Moscow. 
President Putin’s speech at the NATO summit in Bucharest in 
March 2008, in which he threatened that Ukraine would dis-
integrate and Georgia would face harmful consequences if they 
became integrated with NATO, may be viewed as a warning 
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that such moves would be made by Russia11. Moscow recognised 
NATO’s initial consent to Kyiv’s and Tbilisi’s participation in the 
Membership Action Plan (MAP), a programme preparing for 
NATO accession, as the beginning of such integration. 
The staggering decision of the NATO summit to postpone a con-
crete decision concerning the participation of two new coun-
tries in the MAP to the end of 2008, coupled with the adoption 
of a political declaration on the future NATO membership of 
Ukraine and Georgia, made Moscow inclined to take decisive 
measures. The war provoked by Russia which led, to Moscow’s 
recognition of independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia (de 
facto Russian protectorates) shocked the West. Even though the 
government opposed to Moscow maintained power in Tbilisi, 
the war was a strategic success for Moscow. This was because the 
leading NATO member states reaffirmed their conviction (and the 
USA became convinced) that neither Georgia nor Ukraine should 
gain entry to the Alliance in the foreseeable future. Russia was 
not punished for its brutal violation of Georgia’s territorial integ-
rity, and friendly dialogue was maintained. The new US admin-
istration in 2009 initiated the so-called ‘reset’ with Russia, and 
the EU came up with the Partnership for Modernisation offer for 
Moscow. 
Russia’s made consistent efforts to create political and economic 
integration structures under its control, with the intention of 
maintaining strategic control of the post-Soviet area. In the first 
half of the 1990s, attempts to rebuild integration ties covering all 
11 “Ukraine in the form existing today was created in the Soviet period. It re-
ceived territories from Poland – after World War II, from Czechoslovakia and 
Romania – and not all of the Black Sea border disputes with Romania have 
been resolved to this day. Ukraine also received vast territories from Russia 
in the east and south of the country. It is a complex state structure. And if 
we add NATO-linked and other issues, the survival of Ukraine as a state is 
uncertain at all”, see President Vladimir Putin’s speech at the NATO sum-
mit in Bucharest, [in:] R. Kupiecki, M. Menkiszak, Stosunki NATO–Federacja 
Rosyjska w świetle dokumentów, PISM, Warszawa 2018.
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or a definite majority of CIS member states (including as part of 
the Economic Union Treaty of 1993) proved unsuccessful. There-
fore, starting from the mid 1990s, Russia developed a so-called 
‘multi-speed integration’ strategy that was intended to enhance 
integration among groups of states: the best illustration was 
provided by the agreements concerning a Russian-Belarusian-
Kazakh customs union, signed in 1994–1995. These efforts were 
intensified in the 2000s, when new, deeper integration projects 
emerged (see Table 2)12.
Considering Ukraine’s (geo)strategic significance and potential, 
Moscow had a particularly strong desire for it to participate in 
the integration structures within Moscow’s orbit. However, Kyiv 
refused to join the EAEC, and Ukraine’s participation in the CES 
project was thwarted by the Orange Revolution in 2004, while 
attempts to force Kyiv to join the Customs Union (and temporar-
ily successfully blocking its association agreement with the Euro-
pean Union) ended up in another revolution in late 2013/early 
2014. This was the factor which triggered Russian aggression 
against Ukraine and the present crisis in Russia’s relations with 
the West13. 
12 For more detail see I. Wiśniewska, Eurasian Integration. Russia’s attempt at 
the economic unification of the post-Soviet area [series: “OSW Studies”, no. 44], 
Warsaw 2013.
13 For more detail see M. Menkiszak, Russia’s Long War on Ukraine, Transatlantic 
Academy Paper Series, Washington 2016; M. Menkiszak, ‘Miński dylemat 
Rosji’, Polski Przegląd Dyplomatyczny 2018, no. 2.
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Table 2. Eurasian integration structures initiated by Russia in 
the 2000s 
structure Participants
date of adoption 
of basic 
documents  
Formal 
beginning 
of 
operation
Eurasian	
Economic	
Community 
(EAEC, Rus. 
ЕврАзЭС)
Russia, 
Belarus, 
Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgyzstan, 
Tajikistan, 
Uzbekistan 
(2006–2008)
October 2000 May 2001 
Common	
Economic	Space	
(CES, Rus. ЕЭП)
Russia, 
Ukraine, 
Belarus, 
Kazakhstan
September 2003 -
Customs	
Union (CU, Rus. 
Таможенный 
союз)
Russia, 
Belarus, 
Kazakhstan
October 2007 / 
November 2009 July 2010
Common	
Economic	Space	
(CES, Rus. ЕЭП) 
[further stage of 
the CU]
Russia, 
Belarus, 
Kazakhstan
December 2010 / 
November 2011
January 
2012
Eurasian	Eco-
nomic	Union 
(EAEU, Rus. 
ЕАЭС) [further 
stage of the CES]
Russia, Bela-
rus, Kazakh-
stan, Kyr-
gyzstan (from 
2015), Armenia 
(from 2015)
May 2014 January 2015
2. Creating a security buffer zone in Central Europe 
This goal needs to be understood as bringing about a situation 
in which the Central European countries (EU and NATO mem-
ber states that used to be part of the Soviet bloc) will form an 
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area where special arms control regulations will apply, impos-
ing stricter restrictions on their military capabilities than those 
pertaining to other regions of Europe, in particular, regulations 
excluding the deployment of weapons of mass destruction, troop 
deployments from other NATO member states (especially US) or 
the creation of significant military installations within their ter-
ritories. 
Towards the end of the 1980s, Soviet policy towards the countries 
belonging to the Soviet bloc was mainly aimed at cutting the costs 
of maintaining the ‘empire’, for example, through reduction in the 
numbers of Soviet troops and by making economic relations more 
market-oriented. However, the greater degree of autonomy the 
countries inside the bloc enjoyed did not mean that Moscow was 
ready to give them carte blanche, especially in the area of secu-
rity. The ‘Autumn of the Nations’ in 1989 and the fall of the com-
munist regimes in Central Europe did not change this situation 
fundamentally either. Although the weakening USSR did not vig-
orously oppose the dissolution of the Soviet bloc’s structures (the 
Comecon and the Warsaw Pact in 1991), it still treated this area as 
its zone of influence. 
What did change were the instruments for maintaining the zone 
and controlling it. The intention was to control it by means of new 
inter-state treaties containing security clauses, preventing the 
countries of the former bloc from entering into ‘hostile alliances’, 
and by maintaining special bilateral economic bonds on ‘market’ 
terms (including in the energy sector) as a way of leveraging Rus-
sian influence. This approach on the part of Moscow was unoffi-
cially branded as the ‘Falin–Kvitsinsky Doctrine’14. It was illus-
trated by a secret document from the International Department 
of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet 
14 Yuli Kvitsinsky served in the period discussed herein as a deputy minister 
for foreign affairs of the USSR, and Valentin Falin served as a secretary of 
the Central Committee and the head of the International Department of the 
Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. 
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Union devised in April 1991, which was leaked to the West and 
contained the following provisions: 
“No potential threat to the military security of the Soviet Union 
may originate from the Eastern European region under any cir-
cumstances. Regardless of how the situation develops in the coun-
tries of this region, it must remain free of foreign military bases 
and armed forces. (…) It is necessary to counteract our former 
allies joining any other military blocs and groupings, above all 
NATO, and in the future probably the Western European Union 
also, and also their participation in any treaties that may lead to 
the deployment of any foreign armed forces in these territories. 
(…) The issue of energy exports to Eastern Europe must be viewed 
as a very important instrument of our general strategy in this 
region”15.
The draft versions of new inter-state treaties sent by the Soviet 
government to the Central European states in late 1990/early 1991 
can be viewed as an attempt at implementing this doctrine. These 
drafts contained clauses prohibiting, for instance: entering into 
hostile alliances and agreements against one another, a ban on 
deployment of foreign troops and a ban on offering (post-)Soviet 
bases for use to foreign countries16. The only country in the region 
15 Rzeczpospolita, no. 137, 14 June 1991 (a reprint from Frankfurter Allgemeine Zei-
tung), quoted from: J. Strzelczyk, Ucieczka ze Wschodu. Rosja w polskiej polityce 
1989–1993, Warszawa 2002.
16 Article 3 of the draft treaty presented by the USSR to Poland in March 1991 
provided that: “The Soviet Union and the Republic of Poland shall not take 
part in any military and political alliances targeted against one of the Par-
ties or enter into agreements that contradict the goals of this Treaty. The 
Parties shall not provide any bases, places of stationing or any other infra-
structure, including premises provided to the Polish Party in connection 
with the withdrawal of Soviet troops from the territory of Poland, for use by 
any alien armed forces. Any activity that may pose a threat to the goals and 
principles of this Treaty is inadmissible in the territory of both Parties, nor is 
it admissible to use their territory for aggression or any other actions involv-
ing the use of violence against the other Party.” Quoted from: J. Strzelczyk, 
Ucieczka…, op. cit. 
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to have agreed to signing a new bilateral treaty of this kind was 
Romania17. 
The government of the ‘new’ Russia formally dissociated them-
selves from the legacy and policy of the USSR, and agreed to sign 
inter-state treaties that did not contain such controversial provi-
sions. After a long period of disputes and negotiations, they finally 
agreed to a gradual withdrawal of the former Soviet Armed Forces 
troops  from Central European countries (this process was finally 
completed in 1995). However, both the policy strategy papers 
that Russia adopted and the political actions that it made may be 
viewed as proof that Moscow was unwilling to accept the idea of 
Central Europe having a special status. 
Such proof is provided, for example, by the provisions in the ini-
tial outline of the Russian Federation’s foreign policy, approved by 
President Yeltsin in April 1993. It stipulated that: “Eastern Europe 
is important for Russia not only as a historical	zone	of	interest 
[highlighted by the author] (…) It is our current strategic task to 
counteract the transformation of Eastern Europe into a specific 
buffer zone isolating us from Europe. At the same time, we cannot 
allow Russia to be ousted by Western countries from the Eastern 
European region, which seems to be a real threat.”18 
The clearest practical manifestation of this line of thinking was 
Russia’s disagreement with Central European countries’ NATO 
accession. From the moment that this option began to be con-
sidered (in 1993) in the political debate among the key member 
states of the Alliance (in response to demands formulated since 
17 The content of the treaty was revised in April 1991 after the collapse of 
the USSR.
18 Quoted from: ‘Główne założenia koncepcji polityki zagranicznej Federacji 
Rosyjskiej zatwierdzone dekretem prezydenta Borysa Jelcyna z 23 kwietnia 
1993 r.’ [in:] R. Kupiecki, M. Menkiszak, Stosunki NATO–Federacja Rosyjska..., 
op. cit. The term ‘Eastern Europe’ was treated as equivalent to countries of 
the former Soviet bloc in the then Russian political nomenclature. 
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1991 by some countries in the region), the Russian government 
waged a massive diplomatic and propaganda campaign aimed at 
demonstrating the alleged harmfulness of such moves; probably 
the longest list of Russian objections concerning this issue was 
the report by the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service, ‘Problems 
of NATO enlargement’, which was made available to the general 
public in November 199319. 
One element of that campaign was a letter in September 1993 from 
President Yeltsin to the leaders of the key NATO member states 
warning against NATO enlargement eastwards and suggesting 
that NATO should establish closer co-operation with Russia20. 
When the US concept of the Partnership for Peace programme 
was adopted (1994) by NATO (the Alliance’s co-operation with 
countries from the former Soviet bloc and other non-member 
European countries), Russia made efforts to ensure that it became 
an alternative to NATO membership and not a stage on the way to 
membership. At that time Russia proposed ‘cross-security guar-
antees’ (from Russia and Western countries) to the Central Euro-
pean states21. 
When, towards the end of 1996, Moscow became aware of the 
fact that it would not manage to block the NATO accession of the 
first group of Central European countries (Poland, Czech Repub-
lic and Hungary), it embarked on intensive talks with the USA 
and NATO concerning a special co-operation agreement. It was 
to include provisions imposing the obligation on the Alliance to 
limit the military consequences of the eastwards enlargement 
19 See ‘Problems of NATO enlargement’. A report presented by the head of the 
federal Foreign Intelligence Service, Yevgeny Primakov, at a press conference 
in Moscow on 25 November 1993 [in:] ibidem. 
20 See: ibidem. (English translation: ‘Russian President Boris Yeltsin’s Letter to 
US President Bill Clinton’, SIPRI Yearbook 1994, Oxford University Press 1994, 
pp. 249–250).
21 See Poland in Russian foreign policy. Speech by the Minister of Foreign Affairs 
of the Russian Federation, Andrey Kozyrev at the Polish-Russian conference 
‘Towards a new partnership’, Kraków, 23 April 1994 [in:] ibidem.
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and guarantees that none of the former Soviet republics would 
join NATO (in practice this, in particular, concerned the Baltic 
states and also Ukraine). Russia also insisted on a prohibition for 
NATO on the use ‘post-Soviet’ military infrastructure in the ter-
ritories of its new member states22. The result that was achieved 
(in the form of NATO declarations followed by the NATO–Russia 
Founding Act of May 1997) was not entirely satisfactory to Mos-
cow. This was owing to the documents containing declarations 
(political, and thus not legally binding) of non-deployment of 
weapons of mass destruction in the territories of the new Central 
European member states and of the absence of any intention of 
permanent stationing of substantial combat forces (no clear defi-
nition of these terms or geographical scope were provided)23. This 
agreement did not guarantee to Russia that further enlargement 
would not take place. Furthermore, NATO managed to convince 
the Kremlin to formally accept the freedom of choice of alliances 
(or of not entering into alliances) by individual countries. 
Russia entered into another round of the struggle for restrict-
ing the military consequences of NATO enlargement to Central 
Europe in 1996–1999, at the forum of the Vienna negotiations con-
cerning the adaptation (revision) of the Treaty on Conventional 
Armed Forces in Europe (CFE of 1990). During the negotiations, 
Russia insisted, amongst other issues, on setting new limits cov-
ering the permitted array of weapons and numbers of military 
22 See R. Asmus, Opening NATO’s Door. How the Alliance Remade Itself for a New 
Era, Columbia University Press, 2002; А. Загорский, Россия в системе 
европейской безопасности, Москва 2017.
23 The key sentence of the document was: “NATO reiterates that in the current 
and foreseeable security environment, the Alliance will carry out its collec-
tive defence and other missions by ensuring the necessary interoperability, 
integration, and capability for reinforcement rather	than	by	additional	
permanent	stationing	of	substantial	combat	forces [highlighted by the 
author]. Accordingly, it will have to rely on adequate infrastructure com-
mensurate with the above tasks.” See R. Kupiecki, M. Menkiszak, Stosunki 
NATO–Federacja Rosyjska..., op. cit. [English version: Founding Act on Mutual 
Relations, Cooperation and Security between NATO and the Russian Federation, 
27 May 1997).
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personnel in the Central European region, which would make it 
possible to not only reduce the military capability of the countries 
in the region but would actually prevent the deployment of allied 
forces there. The solutions adopted in this case (ACFE of 1999) were 
also a compromise. The treaty (which ultimately did not enter into 
force) allowed for limited contingents of allied forces to be tempo-
rarily stationed in Central European countries. Russia also did not 
manage to push through the demand that the treaty should also 
cover the Baltic states24.  
The political and legal situation regarding this issue also remained 
unchanged during the next wave of NATO enlargement eastwards 
in 2004. Before six former members of the Soviet bloc (Slovakia, 
Romania, Bulgaria, Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia) received invi-
tations to join the alliance, NATO and Russia signed (in May 2002) 
another political document enhancing bilateral co-operation 
which reiterated the formulae from the Founding Act25. Regard-
less of this, Moscow did not alter its critical stance on NATO 
enlargement, although when the Baltic states became members of 
the Alliance (in March 2004) its reactions were limited to politi-
cal and rhetoric expressions of dissatisfaction and attempts at 
reducing the military consequences of the enlargement26. 
24 For more detail see A. Kobieracki, Z. Lachowski, J.M. Nowak, Między 
równowagą sił a bezpieczeństwem kooperatywnym w Europie: adaptacja reżimu 
CFE do nowego środowiska międzynarodowego, Centre for International Rela-
tions, Warsaw 1999; Cf. Z. Lachowski, The Adapted CFE Treaty and the Admis-
sion of the Baltic States to NATO, SIPRI 2002; А. Загорский, Россия в системе…, 
op. cit.
25 Stosunki NATO–Russia. Nowa jakość. Deklaracja szefów państw i rządów 
państw członkowskich NATO i Federacji Rosyjskiej, Rzym, 28 maja 2002 
[in:] R. Kupiecki, M. Menkiszak, Stosunki NATO–Federacja Rosyjska..., op. cit. 
(English version: NATO–Russia Relations: A New Quality. Declaration by Heads 
of State and Government of NATO Member States and the Russian Federation, 
28 May 2002).
26 Russia, for example, protested against the building of new military instal-
lations in the Baltic states and suggested that these countries should sign 
agreements on avoiding dangerous military activity that would set restric-
tions concerning NATO activity. 
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In turn, the Russian government reacted very harshly to any 
manifestations of – even temporary or symbolic – deployment of 
Allied forces in the territories of the new Central European mem-
ber states (in practice, these were US forces as a rule). This was 
so in the case of the rotational presence of the US contingents in 
the air and marine bases in Romania and Bulgaria since 2007, 
which initially mainly involved transit of US forces to and from 
Afghanistan) or the symbolic presence of US forces in Poland, and 
even the temporary presence of the unarmed battery of Patriot 
missiles in Poland. The same concerned all larger exercises of the 
Allied forces in Central Europe. 
However, what raised the greatest concern in Russia (which 
entailed its diplomatic and propaganda campaign) were the US 
plans, crystallised from around 2000, to deploy elements of the 
US missile defence system in Central Europe, aimed at protecting 
US and NATO forces from a possible future nuclear missile attack 
from Iran. 
Although Moscow would vary the arguments for its objections 
from time to time (from the improper, in its opinion, trajectory of 
the missiles, through the threat to Russia’s strategic nuclear capa-
bility, up to the possibility of deploying offensive weapons as part 
of the system), the actual reasons behind its resistance were the 
expected geopolitical and geostrategic consequences of the imple-
mentation of these plans. Deployment of elements of the US missile 
defence system would mean that permanent US military instal-
lations of strategic significance would appear in Central Europe 
(in the first project concept in Poland and the Czech Republic and 
in the second – in Romania and Poland). In turn, their presence 
would make the USA inclined to intensify its engagement in the 
region’s security. 
Given this situation, it is not surprising that neither the inclusion 
of the aforementioned project in NATO’s missile defence plans 
nor the reductions in scope on two occasions (in 2009 and 2013) of 
P
O
IN
T 
O
F 
V
IE
W
  1
0/
20
19
29
plans linked to the system (including the US abandoning the final 
phase of its improvement in defensive capabilities) have caused 
a change in Russia’s stance. Neither did its attitude change after 
Washington offered it the option of monitoring future installa-
tions and conducting inspections on site, nor did the readiness of 
the US–NATO side to coordinate the system’s operation with Rus-
sian systems make any difference27. 
In turn, the demands from Russia, formalised in November 2010, 
for establishing a joint Russia–NATO missile defence system, to 
jointly manage it and divide the defence area into sectors where 
Russia would control the area above the eastern part of Central 
Europe and Scandinavia (see Map 128), proved unacceptable to 
NATO. 
Regardless of the intensive talks and repeated protests and threats 
from Moscow, it did not manage to block the launch of the missile 
defence component (Aegis Ashore) in Deveselu, Romania in 2016. 
Nevertheless, it constantly insisted on postponing or blocking the 
launch of the identical component in Redzikowo, Poland, the con-
struction of which began in 2016. In February 2019 (after the INF 
treaty had been mutually suspended by the USA and Russia – see 
further in this text), the Russian Ministry of Defence demanded 
that the USA should destroy the Mk-41 launchers deployed in 
Deveselu (the key part of the Aegis Ashore installation), claiming 
that they violated the Russian-US treaty. The Russian-US dispute 
over the INF Treaty was, apparently, closely linked to the Russian 
political goals outlined above (both creating a buffer zone in Cen-
tral Europe and restricting US presence in Europe).  
27 For more detail see R. Weitz, Deja vu with BMD: The Improbability of Russia – 
NATO Missile Defense, Russie.Nei.Visions, No. 67, IFRI, Paris, January 2013. 
28 For more detail see А. Загорский, Россия в системе…, op. cit.
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The	Russian-US	dispute	over	the	INF	Treaty29
The Treaty on Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces signed in De-
cember 1987 by the USA and the USSR (it came into force in June 
1988, the Russian Federation became its key successor) forbade 
the USA and the USSR (Russia) from possessing, producing and 
flight-testing ground-launched ballistic and cruise missiles 
(and their launchers) with ranges from 500 to 5500 km, and 
provided for the decommissioning of existing arsenals. It did 
not cover missiles launched from ships and aircraft. The parties 
implemented the provisions of the treaty in 10 years. 
After 2000, as the USA initiated the missile defence project 
(including in Central Europe), Russia began suggesting that it 
might for this reason, and also due to the development of mis-
sile defence programmes by some Asian countries, withdraw 
from the INF Treaty. This threat was formulated openly by 
key individuals, such as the head of the Russian Armed Forces 
General, Yuri Baluyevsky, in February 2007 and President Pu-
tin in October 2007. 
In the same year Russia developed and in 2008 tested (in vio-
lation of the INF Treaty) a new intermediate-range ground-
launched cruise missile (9M728) with a presumed range of 
at least 1500 km, based on marine-launched Kalibr missiles 
(which are not prohibited by the INF). As the development 
work was continued, another ground-launched cruise mis-
sile (9M729), with a presumed range of at least 2500 km, was 
developed. Both missiles were adjusted for launching from  
29 For more detail see J. Gotkowska, A. Wilk, ‘The US intends to quit the INF 
treaty’ [series: “OSW Analyses”], 23 October 2018; J. Gotkowska, ‘The end of 
the INF: the beginning of tough negotiations’ [series: “OSW Analyses”], 12 
December 2018; M. Menkiszak, ‘Russia’s game of shadows around the INF’, 
[series: “OSW Analyses”], 6 February 2019; Russian Compliance with the Inter-
mediate Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty: Background and Issues for Congress, 
Congressional Research Service, 27 June 2019. 
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modified Iskander system wheeled platforms (which, as 
a standard, launch short-range ballistic missiles). 
According to intelligence information revealed by the USA 
towards the end of 2016, two battalions of new 9M729 mis-
siles were accepted for service, and two more were accepted 
in 2018. In this way, Russia aggravated the situation of stra-
tegic imbalance in Europe to the detriment of NATO. Russia 
rejected the accusations of violating the INF Treaty that had 
been raised by the USA since 2013 and failed to respond to in-
junctions to start respecting it again. Russia itself accused the 
USA of alleged violations of the treaty by constructing combat 
drones (not envisaged in the treaty), using ballistic target mis-
siles for missile defence exercises (which do not qualify for the 
definition of the treaty-prohibited missiles) and installing in 
Europe the ground versions of the Mk-41 anti-missile launch-
ers, capable of launching intermediate-range ship-launched 
Tomahawk missiles (these launchers are capable of this only 
after adaptation). 
On 20 October 2018, the US President Donald Trump announced 
that the United States would quit the treaty due to violations of 
the treaty by Russia and the fact that the treaty did not cover 
China. On 4 December 2018, the US stance was formally backed 
by other NATO member states. The Russia-US (on 15 January 
in Geneva) and Russia-NATO (the meeting of the NATO–Rus-
sia Council on 25 January in Brussels) meetings, during which 
this issue was raised, turned out to be fruitless. Since Russia 
rejected the US accusations and reminders to begin respecting 
the treaty once more and failed to comply with Washington’s 
ultimatum regarding this issue, on 1 February 2019 the USA 
gave notice that it was terminating the INF Treaty, suspend-
ing the implementation of its obligations thereunder, to which 
Russia responded with an analogous decision on 2 February. Six 
months later, on 2 August 2019, the treaty lost effect.
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3. Influence and presence in Europe: minimising that of 
the USA and maximising Russia’s
These two interlinked goals need to be viewed as a desire to 
achieve a condition in which the USA, which is seen by Russia 
as a strategic opponent, will gradually reduce its military pres-
ence in Europe to a minimum and disengage from its activities in 
defence of the continent. Russia, in turn, will gain the ability to 
co-decide on the key European security issues, in an optimal sce-
nario through formal mechanisms offering it the right of veto. 
The notion of Russia as a participant in a collective security system 
in Europe, vested with full rights, was not a novel one. Formally, it 
was supported, for example, by the Soviet Union after the end of 
World War II. Beginning in 1989, Mikhail Gorbachev returned to 
the idea of a new European security system by promoting the idea 
of a ‘common European home’30. In both cases the main obstacle, 
in Moscow’s perception, was the USA and the creation or mainte-
nance of the political and military bloc (NATO) in which Wash-
ington had the dominant position. 
As the USSR neared its demise, Moscow saw in such documents 
as the Charter of Paris for a New Europe (1990) the germina-
tion of a new European security architecture based on the CSCE 
processes and rules, eliminating the division into blocs that had 
30 Gorbachev claimed, for example, that: “We support complete withdrawal 
of all foreign troops from the territories of other countries (…) We support 
liquidation of all military blocs and promptly starting a political dialogue 
between them to achieve this, we support building the atmosphere of trust 
which will exclude any unexpected situations. (…) Europeans will only be 
able to cope with the challenges of the coming century if they join their ef-
forts. We are convinced that what they need is a united Europe – peaceful 
and democratic, maintaining its entire diversity and faithful to the com-
monly shared humanistic ideals.” See Speech by Secretary General of the 
Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Chairman 
of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, Mikhail Gorbachev at 
the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, Strasburg, 6 July 1989 
[in:] R. Kupiecki, M. Menkiszak, Stosunki NATO–Federacja Rosyjska…, op. cit.
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formed during the Cold War period. In an ideal variant, the struc-
tures of both the Warsaw Pact and NATO would have been dis-
banded, yet the asymmetry of the political legitimacy meant that 
only the former ceased to exist. 
Russian diplomacy returned to the idea of a ‘new European secu-
rity architecture’ shortly after the collapse of the USSR. Chrono-
logically, the first serious project of this kind was the Pan-Euro-
pean Partnership Concept, presented in 1994 by the then Russian 
minister of foreign affairs, Andrey Kozyrev31. Pursuant to this 
concept, the institutional reform of the Organisation for Security 
and Co-operation in Europe32 was expected to turn it into a cen-
tral structure and basis of European security. Its proposed new 
authority (named in proposals as the Permanent Committee or 
Security Council, formed by ‘European powers’ that obviously 
included Russia) was to regulate the key security policy issues and 
coordinate the operation of other structures in this area (NATO, 
WEU, EU, CIS). In turn, the North Atlantic Co-operation Council 
(NACC, a body established on NATO’s initiative towards the end 
of 1991 for dialogue between NATO member states and countries 
from the former Warsaw Pact) was, upon becoming independent 
from the Alliance, to gain similar coordination powers in the mil-
itary sphere. It does not need to be added that creating a system 
like this would in practice have meant marginalisation of NATO 
(and possibly its future disintegration), while on the other hand it 
would have guaranteed Russia genuine influence over decisions 
concerning European security (and thus it would also have ena-
bled it to block NATO enlargement).
31 See: Poland in Russian foreign policy. Speech by the Minister of Foreign Affairs 
of the Russian Federation, Andrey Kozyrev at the Polish-Russian conference 
‘Towards a new partnership’, Kraków, 23 April 1994 [in:] ibidem; Speech by 
the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, Andrey Kozyrev 
at the meeting of the North Atlantic Co-operation Council (NACC), Istanbul, 
10 June 1994 [in:] ibidem. 
32 The OSCE was established in the process of the institutionalisation of the 
CSCE at the end of 1994.
P
O
IN
T 
O
F 
V
IE
W
  1
0/
20
19
35
Regardless of the frosty reception these Russian proposals 
received, Moscow was unrelenting in pushing through the new 
security architecture concept as part of the discussion on the ‘new 
comprehensive European security model for the 21st century’. One 
element of the Russian proposals (made in 1996) was the Euro-
pean Security Charter (ESC). Russia wanted this to be a new – and 
ideally legally binding – document intended to codify the princi-
ples and the foundations of the new security order in Europe. The 
‘indivisibility of security’ was the most important principle for 
Moscow; this principle was interpreted so that ‘security cannot 
be achieved at the expense of others’ security’. In practice, Russia 
believed that the principle of ‘indivisibility of security’ offered it 
the right of veto with regard to NATO enlargement (which, as it 
claimed, posed a threat to its security)33. The ESC was signed in 
1999 in the wake of lengthy discussions at the OSCE forum, but 
only as a generalised political document that, in principle, reiter-
ated the provisions of the previous documents adopted as part of 
the CSCE and OSCE.  
The initiative put forward in June 2008 by the then Russian presi-
dent, Dmitry Medvedev (the so-called ‘Medvedev Initiative’), clearly 
drew upon the ESC idea. At that time, he came up with the pro-
posal of convening a pan-European conference with the intention 
of developing a European security treaty. Moscow returned to this 
concept once more after the hiatus caused by the Russian-Georgian 
war; in November 2009 it presented a draft treaty34 addressed to all 
European states and organisations (including the USA and Canada). 
It envisaged introducing a rather complex system for regulating 
conflicts in Europe that (contrary to the declarations of its authors) 
would provide an alternative to the UN system. Key elements of the 
system included a facility for acknowledging reservations by indi-
vidual countries regarding other countries’ security and defence 
33 For more detail see А. Загорский, Россия в системе…, op. cit.
34 See Draft European security treaty, Moscow, 29 November 2009 [in:] R. Ku-
piecki, M. Menkiszak, Stosunki NATO–Federacja Rosyjska…, op. cit. 
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policies, which would launch a multi-stage dispute resolution pro-
cedure. This multi-stage process, combined with numerous oppor-
tunities for sabotaging the process, rendered the proposed mecha-
nism ineffective and could thus serve Russia’s overriding interest, 
namely that of blocking potential US and NATO decisions in the 
realm of security. At the same time, this would strip Europe of any 
chance of having an effective means for resolving crises (such as 
the Russian-Georgian war in 2008). For this reason, the Russian 
initiative was watered down and subsequently halted in the course 
of endless discussions, mainly at the OSCE forum (including the so-
called ‘Corfu Process’). 
Key	provisions	of	the	Russian	draft	European	security	treaty
The draft European security treaty was a rather brief and 
generalised document consisting of 14 articles. It imposed the 
obligation on all its participants (covering North American, 
European and CIS countries and the multilateral structures: 
the EU, the OSCE, NATO, the CSTO and the CIS) to be guided 
in their policy by the principle of equality and indivisibility of 
security understood as not ensuring security for one entity at 
the expense of others’ security. The document obliged all par-
ties to refrain individually and collectively from any actions 
that might infringe upon the security interests of other par-
ticipants; not to use their own territories and the territories 
of other participants to launch or support military aggression 
on the territory of another participant or any other actions 
that might harm its security; to take measures as part of mul-
tilateral structures to comply with these principles; to provide 
information on actions taken by one party in the area of secu-
rity in response to a motion from any of the other participants; 
and not to make any international commitments that would 
be contrary to the provisions of the treaty. 
The draft also envisaged a response mechanism in the event of 
any disputes. It offered the opportunity to each of its participants 
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which perceives that its security interests are – or may be – vio-
lated to conduct consultations with the participants concerned 
and, after holding the consultations, to convene (following a mo-
tion from at least two participants) a conference of the parties. 
Decisions taken in the conference would be binding upon the 
participants, provided that at least 2/3 of the parties took part 
in it and the decisions were passed by consensus. In the case of 
military aggression against one of the participants, the party 
being the victim would have the right to convene an extraordi-
nary conference of participants, the decisions of which would 
be binding, provided that at least 4/5 of the parties participated 
and the decisions were passed by consensus. 
The treaty would be open to be signed by North American, Eu-
ropean and CIS countries and the multilateral structures: the 
EU, the OSCE, NATO, the CSTO and the CIS, and would come 
into force upon being ratified by at least 25 countries or struc-
tures. Other countries or structures could join the treaty sub-
ject to consent from all the participants. The draft also envis-
aged that each of its participants could withdraw from it, if it 
deemed that exceptional circumstances posing a threat to its 
interests had emerged. 
While looking for opportunities to transform European security 
in a manner that would suit its interests, since the late 1990s Mos-
cow had also been keeping a watchful eye on the deepening inte-
gration inside the European Union and its development as part 
of the European Security and Defence Policy. Russia, most likely, 
saw these processes as an opportunity for increasing European 
autonomy in the field of security, which in practice would mean 
a gradual reduction of Europe’s dependence on the USA. This was 
clearly put, for example, in 2009 by the then Russian ambassador 
to NATO, Dmitry Rogozin, who stated: “Therefore, a strong and 
independent Europe is in our [Russia’s] interests. And developing 
the EU’s military capabilities and security policy is an important 
factor in European and global security. Time has come for Europe 
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to stop behaving like an occupied continent and to start express-
ing a political will of its own”35. 
The security dialogue launched in 2000 was thus one of the prior-
ity areas of the Russia–EU dialogue. As part of establishing closer 
co-operation with the West after the terrorist attacks on 11 Sep-
tember 2001, Russia and the EU agreed (in October 2001) to cre-
ate regular formats for operational dialogue concerning security 
issues. However, the lack of serious successes in developing the 
ESDP and the repeating crises in Russian-Western relations made 
the EU less and less appealing as a partner to Russia in this area36. 
The dialogue between Russia and the EU in 2003–2005, based 
on the ‘common spaces’ concept, led to several ‘common security 
spaces’ being defined, including the Common Space of External 
Security (it envisaged co-operation in combating terrorism, non-
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, arms control, resolv-
ing international crises and peacekeeping operations) and the 
Common Space of Freedom, Security and Justice (offering room 
for co-operation in dealing with ‘soft security’ threats, including 
combating organised crime, drug trafficking, illegal migration, 
etc.), and even signing a series of political documents in May 2005 
known as ‘road maps’ for the implementation of the four ‘common 
spaces.’ However, these documents were merely general declara-
tions of intentions which led to operational co-operation only to 
a limited extent, let alone political integration37. 
The idea of further institutionalisation of the dialogue between the 
EU and Russia in the area of security was resumed a few years later as 
part of the search for ways of establishing closer European-Russian 
35 D. Rogozin, How NATO could improve its relations with Russia, Europe’s World, 
Spring 2009. 
36 For more detail see M. Menkiszak, Russia vs. the European Union: a “strategic 
partnership’ crisis [series: “OSW Studies”, no. 22], Warsaw 2006; А. Загорский, 
Россия в системе…, op. cit.
37 See the text of the documents in EU–Russia Road Map for the Common Spaces. 
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co-operation during the presidency of Medvedev, who gave many 
Western politicians hope that Russia might return to the path of 
liberal reforms and constructive co-operation with the West. In 
June 2010, a Russian-German declaration was signed in Meseberg 
that included a proposal to set up a new body for consultation and 
coordination in the area of European security: the Russia–EU Per-
manent Security Committee38. However, this proposal was not 
backed on a broader scale inside the EU. When Berlin realised that 
Moscow had no political will to constructively resolve the Trans-
nistrian issue (which Germany treated as a test of Russian inten-
tions regarding the PSC), the concept of establishing a Russia–EU 
Permanent Security Committee was finally abandoned. 
The aforementioned Russian moves in relations with the EU fit-
ted in with the broader concept of Russian-European co-operation 
known as ‘Greater Europe’39. For a long time, it remained merely 
an ambiguous slogan used by both President Yeltsin (in 1997) and 
President Putin (in 2001 and 2005); its economic aspect was devel-
oped by the latter in November 201040. The concept was based on 
the assumption that Russia (or a Eurasian integration bloc that it 
created) and the EU might reach an agreement concerning limited 
integration offering an exchange of benefits to its parties (Euro-
pean capital and technologies to Russia, and Russian raw materi-
als, geopolitical depth and military potential to Europe). In fact, 
this was a project aimed at dividing Europe into two blocs: western 
(dominated by Germany) and eastern (dominated by Russia) with 
the intention of ousting the United States from Europe and com-
peting with the USA and other global economic centres. Plans to 
38 See the text of the declaration (in the Russian version) in Меморандум 
по итогам встречи Президента России Д.Медведева и Федерального 
канцлера Германии А.Меркель 4–5 июня 2010 года, г.Мезеберг.
39 For more detail see M. Menkiszak, Greater Europe. Putin’s Vision of the Euro-
pean (Dis)integration [series: “OSW Studies”, no. 46], Warsaw 2013.
40 See ‘Россия и Европа: от осмысления уроков кризиса – к новой повестке 
партнерства’ – an article by Prime Minister Vladimir Putin in Süddeutsche 
Zeitung, 25 November 2010; German version see: ‘Von Lissabon bis Wladi-
wostok’.
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build this shady geopolitical construction were, however, thwarted 
by the crisis which broke out between Russia and the EU in 2014 as 
a result of the Russian aggression against Ukraine.
Given this situation, the Russian government began to employ the 
concept devised among a group of pro-Kremlin experts, known 
popularly as ‘Greater Eurasia.’ It envisaged enhancing economic and 
political co-operation between Russia, the Eurasian Economic Union 
and China, in addition to the ASEAN countries and possibly the EU 
(provided that the latter lifted sanctions imposed on Russia)41. 
However, it was not just Europe or Eurasia that served as points of 
reference in Russian security concepts. Even though the USA has 
long been viewed by Russia as its strategic opponent, and NATO 
as an instrument of US policy (one of its functions being to ensure 
that most of Europe is subordinated to the USA in terms of secu-
rity), Moscow, being aware of the political reality, would from 
time to time make attempts at gaining influence over European 
security by establishing closer co-operation with the Alliance. 
Halting the process of eastwards NATO enlargement was one of 
Russia’s priorities. Moscow’s objective was to convince the US 
and other governments that special partnership and co-opera-
tion with Russia represented an alternative solution. At the same 
time, viewing itself as a great power, Russia was reluctant to co-
operate in the forums of multilateral structures linked to NATO, 
such as the North Atlantic Co-operation Council42 or Partnership 
for Peace, a program functioning since 1994. In practice, NATO 
pursued a parallel policy of ‘rewarding’ or rather ‘compensating’ 
41 These ideas were in fact to serve as a cover story for the increasingly asym-
metric relations between Moscow and Beijing that were to Russia’s disadvan-
tage, and at the same time as a kind of deterrent with regard to the European 
Union. For more detail on this issue see: M. Kaczmarski, W. Rodkiewicz, 
‘Russia’s Greater Eurasia and China’s New Silk Road: adaptation instead of 
competition’ [series: “OSW Commentaries”], no. 219, 21 July 2016.
42 NACC was established in December 1991 to be transformed into the Euro-
Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) in May 1997. 
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to Russia for the subsequent stages of its enlargement, tightening 
privileged partnership and developing institutions with it. This 
process began in 1995, and its major stages included: signing the 
declaration in Noordwijk aan Zee (May 1995), the previously men-
tioned NATO–Russia Founding Act (May 1997) which gave rise to 
the NATO–Russia Permanent Joint Council (PJC) and the Rome 
Declaration (May 2002), as a result of which the NATO–Russia 
Council (NRC) was established43. 
Even though a dozen or so specific co-operation committees had 
been established and numerous documents had been signed, 
and despite temporary operational NATO–Russia co-operation 
on resolving the crises in Bosnia and Herzegovina and in Kosovo 
(as part of the SFOR and KFOR forces in 1996–2003), Russia was 
generally disillusioned by this co-operation. The dialogue and co-
operation structures that had been built, contrary to Moscow’s 
intention, did not become forums for co-deciding on European 
security that would give Russia at least an informal right to veto 
the Alliance’s decisions (although, under  pressure from Moscow, 
the NATO–Russia Council (NRC) formally withdrew from the so-
called ‘pre-coordination’ of the stances of the Alliance’s member 
states in most of the specified areas).  
Russia’s determination to ensure that it had the ability to formally 
co-decide on European security was so strong that it would probe 
on several occasions whether it would be possible to begin a dis-
cussion on its membership in political (but not military) NATO 
structures. This option had already been tested by Mikhail Gor-
bachev in the spring and summer of 1990. In turn, Russian Fed-
eration governments would repeatedly raise this issue over the 
years: in December 1991 (a letter from President Yeltsin to the par-
ticipants of the NACC meeting); once more in early 1995 (during 
the meetings of the Minister of Foreign Affairs Andrey Kozyrev 
43 Texts of the documents in R. Kupiecki, M. Menkiszak, Stosunki NATO–Fede-
racja Rosyjska…, op. cit. 
P
O
IN
T 
O
F 
V
IE
W
  1
0/
20
19
42
and his deputy Georgy Mamedov); in March and June 2000 (inter-
view with President Putin for the BBC and statements from the 
Secretary of the Security Council, Sergey Ivanov); in 2001 (state-
ments by Putin and Sergey Ivanov between July and October); in 
2006 (during Putin’s talks with NATO secretary general); and in 
2009 and 2010 (statements from President Medvedev)44. One may 
notice that this usually happened at politically game-changing 
moments, giving rise to Moscow’s hopes that a new modus vivendi 
could be agreed with the West.
These initiatives had precedent behind them. It is worth noting 
that in 1954 the Soviet government applied for NATO membership 
before it decided to set up the Warsaw Pact. However, both in 1954 
and following the collapse of the USSR, this was more of a negative 
stance: a desire to block unwanted moves from the Alliance (the 
FRG’s accession to the Alliance in 1954, and blocking or neutralis-
ing the process of eastward NATO enlargement in the 1990s and 
2000s), or as an argument for the thesis that the West lacks a con-
structive stance on Russia. It does not need to be added here that 
Russia – emphasising its sovereignty and great power status – did 
not manifest any desire to adapt itself to NATO standards in the 
political sphere (let alone military). 
4. Russian policy: continuity or change? 
Over a period spanning almost thirty years, regardless of the 
changing political regimes, reshuffles inside the government elite 
and among the most senior officials and changes in the inter-
national situation, Moscow has been attempting to implement 
the same strategic goals with regard to the West and NATO. Is it 
therefore possible to speak about changes in its approach to this 
issue? In the author’s opinion, changes in the Russian policy are 
evident in three aspects.
44 Texts of Yeltsin’s letter and fragments of Putin’s interview and Medvedev’s 
speech in ibidem.
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Firstly,	variations	 in	Russian	tactics	and	a	variety	of	 institu-
tional	 forms	 of	 conducting	 foreign	 policy	may	 be	 seen.	 In an 
attempt to gain strategic control of the post-Soviet area (which is con-
ventionally referred to as the ‘CIS area’), Russia would put forward 
numerous projects envisaging co-operation and integration in secu-
rity and defence and politico-economic areas, with slightly different 
membership configurations. It would push through further integra-
tion stages without waiting until the specified short- and medium-
term goals had been achieved. In some cases, enlarging the integra-
tion area was treated as a priority even at the expense of complicating 
the implementation of agreements that had already been adopted. 
Russia has also come up with various proposals and demands 
with regard to Central Europe – be it ‘cross-security guarantees’ 
or restricting the military consequences of NATO membership, 
which all served the same strategic goals in any case. 
The variability of Russian tactics can most easily be discerned in 
the different models and variants of the new security architecture 
in Europe. By responding to changes in the situation and through 
modifying its definitions, Russia has been able to smoothly trans-
fer from attempts at building this architecture on the basis of 
the OSCE to attempts based on having privileged relations with 
NATO, while in the meantime testing out the option of enhancing 
security co-operation with the EU. 
Table 3. Major Russian initiatives affecting European security
Year Initiative	put	forward Key	entities	to	implement	the initiative
1989 Common European Home
CSCE, NATO and Warsaw Pact 
member states (following the 
disbanding of the blocs)
1994/1995 Pan-European Partnership Concept
CSCE/OSCE, NACC  
(after detaching from NATO)
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Year Initiative	put	forward Key	entities	to	implement	the initiative
1995 privileged partnership with NATO Russia and NATO
1996 European Security Charter OSCE
1997 privileged partnership with NATO
Russia and NATO  
(PJC mechanism)
1997 Greater Europe Russia, EU, European countries
2000/2001 
EU–Russia security 
dialogue, Greater 
Europe
EU and Russia  
(mechanism of ambassador 
meetings with the PSC Three)
2002 privileged partnership with NATO
Russia and NATO  
(NRC mechanism)
2003/2005 EU–Russia common spaces, Greater Europe EU and Russia
2008/2009 European Security Treaty
OSCE area countries and 
organisations 
2010 Political and Security Committee Russia and EU
2011 Greater Europe
EU and European countries Russia 
and Customs Union (planned 
Eurasian Economic Union)
2015/16 Greater Eurasia
China, Russia, Eurasian 
Economic Union, possibly EU 
member states
Secondly,	there	has	been	a	noticeable	long-term	trend	of	dimi-
nishing	ambitions	in	Russia’s	European	security	policy.	This 
is especially evident in the case of Russia’s policy towards Cen-
tral Europe. In the final years of the USSR’s existence (1989–1991), 
Moscow attempted to cut the costs of maintaining its sphere of 
influence in the region (even at the expense of disbanding the 
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structures of the Soviet bloc), yet it did not want to give this up 
completely. Hence its attempts to impose on Central European 
countries a peculiar model of limited sovereignty in the area 
of security and defence policy. In the next stage (1992–1997, or 
1992–2002 in the case of the Baltic states), Russia already lacked 
any ambition to impose security clauses envisaging unequal 
treatment on the countries in the region: its goal was to pre-
vent them from joining NATO and to create a buffer zone in the 
region separating it from the NATO area. Finally, when, after 
more countries in this region had been invited to join NATO, 
the enlargement process proved impossible to halt, Russia made 
efforts to negotiate at various political forums that sought to 
curtail the military consequences of the enlargement and thus 
establish a kind of buffer zone but this time inside NATO, on its 
Eastern flank. 
A similar evolution can be tracked in Russia’s policy with regard 
to the post-Soviet area. As the USSR declined, Moscow’s goal was 
to reform the union state while maintaining close bonds and 
some aspects of the common institution. When the collapse of 
the USSR had become an undeniable fact, Russia initially tried 
to maintain elements of the common space (especially military). 
When this proved impossible, it made an attempt at creating new 
structures for co-operation between most of the countries in the 
post-Soviet area. However, when it became obvious that co-oper-
ation within a larger group was dysfunctional, it adopted the 
multi-speed integration tactic. Even though the goals of the next 
integration projects were increasingly ambitious, Moscow at the 
same time increasingly had to give up pushing through politi-
cal integration and replace it with economic integration, while 
offering its partners more and more benefits (and/or threaten 
them with increasingly serious consequences) to convince them 
to participate in its projects. 
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» political crisis in Russia
» US-Russian START-2 treaty
» EU–Russia Partnership
and Co-operation Agreement
» Russia in Partnership for Peace with NATO
» end of First Chechen War
» Yeltsin re-elected for president of Russia
» Russia as part of IFOR in Bosnia
» Second phase of NATO enlargement
Eastwards
» Orange Revolution in Ukraine
» NATO bombardments in Yugoslavia
» First phase of NATO enlargement
Eastwards
» Second Chechen War
» Russia as part of KFOR in Kosovo
» Adapted CFE treaty
» Putin elected for president of Russia
» EU–Russia energy and security dialogue
» September 11 attacks
» new EU–Russia security framework
» NATO–Russia Council
» USA leaves the ABM treaty
» US-Russian SORT treaty
» US intervention in Iraq
» detention of Mikhail Khodorkovsky
» Rose Revolution in Georgia
» Tulip Revolution in Kyrgyzstan
» EU–Russia ‘Common Space’ road maps
» Putin’s speech in Munich
» Russia leaves the CFE treaty
» Russia resumes strategic bomber
aircraft patrols
» Russian cyber-attack on Estonia
» First Chechen War
» NATO bombardments in Bosnia
» NATO–Russia Founding Act
» Russia joins G-7
» economic crisis in Russia
» G-8 summit in Saint Petersburg
» Kosovo declares independence
» Russian-Georgian War
» Russia recognises ‘independence’
of Abkhazia and South Ossetia
» beginning of economic crisis in Russia
» Dmitri Medvedev elected for president
of Russia
» collapse of the USSR
» Russia in NACC
1991
2000
2002
2003
2005
2001
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
2006
1999
2007
2004
2008
PERIODS OF CRISIS AND DÉTENTE  
IN RUSSIAN-WESTERN RELATIONS
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» Tulip Revolution in Kyrgyzstan
» EU–Russia ‘Common Space’ road maps
» protests in Russia
» Putin re-elected for president of Russia
» mutual US-Russian political sanctions
» US–Russia reset
» aggressive exercises Zapad 2009
» US limits its missile defence project
in Europe
» US-Russian START-3 treaty
» the EU launches Partnership
for Modernisation with Russia
» Arab Spring in Tunisia, Egypt and
Libya
» civil war in Syria
» protests in Russia
» Russia starts unannounced military
exercises
» Edward Snowden is granted asylum
in Russia
» protests in Ukraine
» Russia launches military intervention
in Syria
» Russian hacker attack on the USA
and interference with the presidential
election
» Russian hacker attacks in Germany
» Russian subversive attempt
in Montenegro
» CAATSA act and new US sanctions
on Russia
» Russian chemical attack in the United
Kingdom and expulsions of diplomats
» launch of construction of the Nord
Stream 2 offshore gas pipeline
» Russian-Ukrainian Kerch Strait incident
» Reinstating Russia’s rights
at the Council of Europe
» USA and Russia withdraw from
the INF treaty
» Revolution of Dignity in Ukraine
» Russia annexes Crimea and starts
the war in Donbas
» mutual Western-Russian political
and economic sanctions
» beginning of economic crisis
in Russia
2019
2009
2011
2010
2015
2017
2018
2014
2012
2016
2013
periods of crisis
in Russian-Western relations
periods of détente
in Russian-Western relations
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Thirdly,	 regardless	 of	 the	 noticeable	 fluctuations	 in	 Russia’s	
relations	 with	 the	 West	 (USA	 and	 NATO/EU),	 one	 can	 see	
a	long-term	tendency	towards	cooling	relations	transforming	
into	a	state	of	quasi-cold	war	between	Russia	and	the	West.  
The recurrent crises in Russian-Western relations: in Chechnya and 
Bosnia (1994–1996), Kosovo (1999), the crisis over the ‘colour revolu-
tions’ (2003–2005), over Georgia (2008) and Ukraine (since 2013), 
turn out to be ever more acute and give rise to increasingly detri-
mental outcomes. The Russian government’s attitude to the West is 
also worsening on a regular basis. The short period of ‘pro-Western 
romanticism’ (1991–1992) was followed by a period of more prag-
matic relations with the West, marked by increasing assertiveness 
on the part of Russian policy – up to the Kosovo crisis, when Russia 
for the first time recognised the West as a potential threat. After 
a short warming of relations when pro-Western sentiments could 
be observed in Russia (2001–2002), President Putin responded to 
the ‘colour revolutions’ in a manner that suggested that he recog-
nised that the threat posed by the West was of a systemic nature. 
After several years of Russia’s unsuccessful attempts to divide 
interests and influence with the West, Russia launched a ‘coun-
teroffensive’ starting from 2007. Another short period of détente 
during Medvedev’s presidency (2009–2011) ended when Putin 
began to feel personally endangered due to an alleged ‘US conspir-
acy’ (from later 2011 in connection with political protests in Rus-
sia). Then the conflict escalated on both sides. In this context, the 
‘Revolution of Dignity’ (or Maidan Revolution) in Ukraine, subse-
quent Russian aggression against Ukraine and the intervention in 
Syria were also seen in Moscow as elements of a proxy war with 
the USA (and more broadly with the West)45. 
45 For more detail see M. Menkiszak, Russia’s best enemy. Russian policy towards the 
United States in Putin’s era [OSW series: “Point of View”, no. 62], Warsaw 2017. 
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II. summary oF The russIan PolIcy and ITs 
PersPecTIves 
An	 evaluation	 of	 the	 implementation	 of	 Russia’s	 strategic	
goals	as	mentioned	above	leads	to	the	conclusion	that	Moscow	
has	not	been	successful.	
It	cannot	be	claimed	that	Russia	has	maintained	or	rebuilt	its	
strategic	control	of	the	post-Soviet	area	(‘CIS	area’).	Russia has 
strong influence (especially in the security and defence field) only 
in the case of two countries in this area: Belarus and Armenia. 
Russian troops are stationed in these countries (to a limited extent 
in Belarus), and these two countries are engaged in close military 
and security co-operation with Russia (Belarus to a greater extent 
than Armenia). However, Moscow’s re-integration ambitions 
have been visibly curbed by local government elites, even in the 
case of these two countries. 
Alyaksandr Lukashenka’s regime in Belarus has mastered to per-
fection the art of capitalising on Russia’s geopolitical and military 
interests, in order to receive economic support from Moscow in 
various forms. It is forced to manoeuvre between the periodic cri-
ses in mutual relations and ostentatious rapprochements. How-
ever, another crisis in Russian-Belarusian relations has been evi-
dent since the second half of 2018. This crisis is more serious than 
the previous ones and was in fact provoked by Minsk’s resistance 
to Moscow pushing through a significant deepening of politi-
cal and economic integration of the two countries (which might 
involve even setting up a confederation or even full ‘unification’ of 
the two states). Armenia heavily relies on Russian security guar-
antees, and its strategic economic sectors are controlled by Rus-
sian entities. Regardless of this, it has managed to maintain prag-
matic relations with Western countries (cf. e.g. CEPA, the political 
agreement signed with the EU in 2017) and to change the govern-
ment elite contrary to Moscow’s will (the opposition leader, Nikol 
Pashinyan, took power in 2018 as a result of a peaceful revolution). 
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Russian influence is smaller, albeit still noticeable, in Kyrgyzstan 
and Tajikistan (whose labour markets rely on workforce migra-
tion to Russia) and in Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan, which are 
wealthier and stronger than the former two countries. However, 
the strengthening Chinese influence in these countries and local 
leaders’ attempts to diversify external relations pose an increas-
ing challenge to Moscow. In turn, regardless of the fact that politi-
cal and economic relations are maintained, Russia’s influence is 
limited in Georgia, Moldova and Uzbekistan (though it has been 
strengthening here recently) and is reduced to a minimum in 
Turkmenistan (which is to a great extent oriented towards China) 
and in Ukraine (which is in fact at war with Russia). 
The failed attempts at subordinating Ukraine may be regarded as 
Moscow’s ultimate defeat. It is true that Russia occupies Crimea 
(which has essentially improved Russia’s geostrategic position in the 
Black Sea region and temporarily given rise to a marked improve-
ment in Putin’s popularity ratings) and part of the Donbas region 
(where it set up its rogue protectorates: the so-called Donetsk and 
Luhansk People’s Republics). Nevertheless, it has not managed to 
force Ukraine to participate in the Eurasian integration project or to 
prevent progress in Ukraine’s integration with the EU (signing the 
Association Agreement, including the Deep and Comprehensive Free 
Trade Agreement and introduction of the visa-free regime). At the 
same time, its moves resulted in strengthening pro-Western senti-
ments among the Ukrainian public and elites and an almost com-
plete liberation of Ukraine from its energy dependence on Russia46. 
In the present situation it is impossible to conceive a Ukraine back 
under Moscow’s strategic control, other than as a result of a military 
conquest (something that Russia – at least for now – is not willing to 
countenance). Meanwhile, each Eurasian integration project propa-
gated by Russia will be flawed without Ukraine’s participation. 
46 For more detail see M. Menkiszak, Miński dylemat Rosji, op. cit.; S. Kardaś, 
T. Iwański, From vassalisation to emancipation. Ukrainian-Russian gas co-oper-
ation has been revised, [series: “OSW Commentaries”], no. 263, 7 March 2018.
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In	 the	 case	 of	 Central	 Europe,	 it	 is	 difficult	 to	 claim	 that	
a	buffer	zone	exists	inside	NATO.	The NATO–Russia Founding 
Act (including its provisions on military restraint that met Rus-
sian demands halfway) is still formally binding and is in princi-
ple respected by NATO, even though Russia has breached most of 
its provisions47. In spite of this, the decisions taken by the USA 
and at the NATO summits in Wales (2014) and Warsaw (2016) to 
strengthen the Alliance’s eastern flank by means of the forward 
rotational military presence (four multinational battalion com-
bat groups in the Baltic states and Poland and rotational presence 
of a US brigade with command in Poland in addition to US forces 
in Romania) resulted in an Allied military presence that despite 
remaining asymmetric is nonetheless substantial and perma-
nent (a total of around 9,000 soldiers). One element of this pres-
ence is in the form of missions aimed at protecting the airspace 
of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia by Allied forces (Baltic Air Polic-
ing), permanently maintained since 2004, and the US and NATO 
missile defence system bases (Aegis Ashore) that have been built 
(in Deveselu, Romania) and the one currently under construction 
(in Redzikowo, Poland).  
Another	 unsuccessful	 goal	was that of ousting the USA from 
Europe and bolstering Russian influence. In fact, quite the reverse 
is taking place, at least in the area of defence. Regardless of exist-
ing tensions in trans-Atlantic relations (which Moscow has been 
trying rather ineptly to capitalise on), since 2014, US military 
47 Russia, in particular, violated the following principles envisaged in the Act: 
developing partnership for the stability and security of the Euro-Atlantic 
area; respect of human rights and civil freedoms; refraining from the use of 
force or threat of using it; respecting the sovereignty, territorial integrity 
and the inviolability of borders of other countries; conflict prevention and 
peaceful resolution of disputes; mutuality and transparency of co-opera-
tion with NATO; co-operation on the adaptation and implementation of the 
CFE Treaty; moderation as regards the structure, potential and deployment 
of armed forces; transparency, mutual trust and predictability as regards 
armed forces; improving arms control systems and trust building measures. 
See Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security between 
NATO and the Russian Federation, Paris, 27 May 1997.
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presence has gradually been increasing and Washington’s defence 
co-operation has been enhanced, not only with Central European 
countries but also, amongst others, with the Nordic states (includ-
ing Sweden and Finland, which are formally unaligned). Mos-
cow has been listening attentively to the demands for ‘strategic 
autonomy’ (from the USA) voiced in some leading EU and NATO 
member states (especially France and Germany)48. Despite this, 
the new initiatives covering defence co-operation between Euro-
pean countries (both inside and outside the EU) do not as of yet 
pose any threat to the functioning of NATO or co-operation with 
the USA, which are still the key security guarantors in Europe49. 
In this context it can be stated that Russia’s influence in Europe 
is shrinking, especially in the area of defence (the situation is 
slightly different in the case of the energy sector, one symbol of 
which is the development of the controversial project of the Nord 
Stream 2 gas pipeline running from Russia to Germany). Mos-
cow has not managed to create any model of European security 
architecture that would provide an alternative to NATO or other 
Western structures; it has not even been able to guarantee itself 
the possibility of formally (or at least informally) co-deciding in 
this field. At the same moment that its practical co-operation with 
NATO and the EU was frozen, its prerogatives in the Council of 
Europe (its Parliamentary Assembly) were reduced50, and the 
48 For example, on 11 November 2018, President Putin in an interview for the 
Russian television RT France backed the idea expressed by the French pres-
ident, Emmanuel Macron, to form a European army, sharing his opinion 
about Europe: “This is completely natural that they want to be independent, 
self-reliant and sovereign in the area of security and defence”. 
49 For more detail on some initiatives see J. Gotkowska, The trouble with PESCO. 
The mirages of European defence [OSW series: “Point of View”, no. 69], War-
saw 2018.
50 Since representatives of the Russian government had threatened that it would 
leave the Council of Europe and the related system of protection offered by the 
European Court of Human Rights from which Russian citizens benefit, on the 
grounds of an informal deal negotiated by Germany and France, the Coun-
cil of Ministers of the Council of Europe passed a resolution on 17 May 2019 
suggesting reinstating Russia’s full rights in the Council of Europe, and on 26 
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mutual political and economic sanctions resulted in trade restric-
tions (especially Western investments in Russia), so that it found 
itself in a state of semi-isolation from the West. 
Russia	has	not	 only	 failed	 to	 achieve	 its	 strategic	 goals	 but	
even	–	due	to	its	aggressive	policy	–	has	provoked	effects	con-
trary	to	those	intended.	What can we expect in this situation? 
Has Moscow learnt any lessons from this?
In the author’s opinion, there are no serious grounds to conclude 
that Russia has completely given up its desire to achieve the 
aforementioned strategic goals. Apparently, it believes that this 
remains possible but will take much more time. 
For	the	time	being,	Russia	is	continuing	its	aggressive	policy.	
This involves continuation of the Russian armament programme, 
in particular, strengthening its military potential in the Western 
strategic direction. Examples of this include the formal establish-
ment of a new tank army; the establishment of three new mech-
anised divisions; increasing militarisation of the Kaliningrad 
Oblast and occupied Crimea; holding massive previously unan-
nounced military exercises with aggressive scenarios51.
June 2019, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe confirmed by 
a majority of the votes that the Russian delegation’s rights at this forum had 
been reinstated. 
51 For more detail see Putin for the fourth time…, op. cit. 
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Map  2. Militarisation of the Russian western flank 
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At the same time, Russia has not given up its demands that NATO 
should discontinue the rotational presence of Allied forces on the 
eastern flank and withhold the construction of elements of the 
missile defence shield in Central Europe. Furthermore, Moscow 
still fails to respect the adapted CFE Treaty, violated (before its 
suspension) the Treaty on Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces 
(INF) and continues to violate or circumvent the Treaty on Open 
Skies and the OSCE’s Vienna Document on Confidence and Secu-
rity Building Measures at the same time refusing any further 
adoption of the latter (see Table 4). 
Other signs of Russia’s increasing aggressiveness are repeated 
cyber-attacks (including on critical infrastructure), massive 
propaganda campaigns and local attempts at destabilising the 
political situation (as in Germany and Montenegro), collectively 
referred to as ‘hybrid actions’. 
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Russia has also maintained its military presence in some Eastern 
European and South Caucasian countries (member states of the 
OSCE and Council of Europe) contrary to their will. On the one 
hand, these are remnants of Russia’s involvement in the ‘post-
colonial wars’ in the 1990s but also a result of hostile measures 
launched later (on Georgia in 2008 and on Ukraine in 2014) and 
Moscow’s political decisions (recognising the ‘independence’ of 
Abkhazia and South Ossetia, occupation and illegal annexation of 
Crimea and the de facto occupation of part of Donbas). 
At	present,	Russia	has	 to	make	a	choice	between	maintain-
ing	(or	even	toughening)	the	confrontational	approach	it	has	
adopted	in	its	European	security	policy	so	far	or	seeking,	at	
the	 expense	of	 some	concessions,	 at	 least	 a	partial	 compro-
mise	with	the	West.	
The factors suggesting that the existing confrontational approach 
will be continued include the make-up, strategic culture and men-
tality of the narrow government circle led by Vladimir Putin. Its 
members, originating primarily from Soviet secret services, tend 
to believe in conspiracy theories and think in terms of worst-case 
scenarios, are attached to the anachronistically interpreted idea 
of Russia as a great power, and usually view international rela-
tions as an arena where nations and countries are fighting for sur-
vival. They are convinced that the West (and especially the USA) 
poses a threat to their power and at the same time they are deter-
mined to maintain this power. Given this atmosphere of deep dis-
trust of the external environment and the awareness of the weak-
nesses of the Russian state and the serious challenges it needs to 
face in various areas, the strategy of compensating for the relative 
(mainly economic) weakness with militarisation of the state, aug-
menting its military potential and aggressive foreign and security 
policy, seems to be their overriding idea concerning the approach 
that needs to be taken with regard to the West and some of the 
neighbouring countries. 
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Domestic policy challenges have also had an impact. In a situation 
where the government, given the ineffectiveness of the authori-
tarian system, market fluctuations and negative socio-economic 
trends, is unable to offer the public any prospects of sustained 
improvement in their living standards, it is tempted to compen-
sate for this with the illusory sense of military strength and great 
power status, to distract public attention from domestic issues by 
provoking external conflicts and attempting to mobilise public 
opinion against alleged external enemies as part of the ‘besieged 
fortress’ myth. 
Last but not least, a whole array of phenomena and trends in inter-
national politics also makes the Kremlin inclined to continue its 
approach. The most important of these (and this is closely watched 
by Russia) include the multidimensional crisis of the West as a com-
munity (increasing trans-Atlantic tension between the USA and its 
other allies, the noticeable weakening of NATO), the USA (politi-
cal crisis and intensifying isolationist trends) and the European 
Union (political, social, economic and ideological crisis and also 
growing significance of the forces which back the policy of conces-
sions towards Moscow). On the other hand, Russia is pinning its 
hopes on the increasing potential and influence of the non-West-
ern world, especially China, which is viewed as Moscow’s natural 
ally in its global rivalry with the USA. This makes the Kremlin 
inclined to ‘wait out’ the crisis with the West until it can be over-
come as a result of growing weaknesses or even to escalate the con-
frontation, including within the territory of Europe, with a view 
to exploiting any ‘window of opportunity’ created by an apparent 
crisis. It is worth adding that Russian diplomacy constantly reiter-
ates a wide array of demands corresponding to Russia’s European 
security policy goals as outlined above, making the ‘normalisa-
tion’ of relations and cessation of political or military confrontation 
dependent on the fulfilment of these demands. 
What may make the Kremlin inclined to	seek	an	ease	in	tensions	
in	its	relations	with	the	West	is the concern about the growing 
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costs of its current confrontation: political, economic and secu-
rity-oriented. Apparently, the key factor in this case is the fear of 
escalation of the political conflict with the USA, leading to further 
toughening of the US sanctions on Russia. Potentially, the sanc-
tions may seriously harm the Russian economy, worsening the 
social situation and adding to internal instability. This gives rise 
to natural concerns about threats posed to the system of govern-
ment and individually to those members within government cir-
cles in Russia. 
At the same time, the increasing tension inside the trans-Atlantic 
community, particularly as viewed from the Kremlin’s perspec-
tive, may encourage Moscow to make attempts to selectively ease 
tension in relations with individual leading European countries 
(especially Germany, France and also Italy) based on existing and 
new business offers and projects and political dialogue, hoping 
that this will lead to an erosion of the European sanctions system 
and trigger an influx of European investments, capital and tech-
nologies so badly needed by the Russian economy. 
Russia has been making attempts to achieve all this but so far it 
has refused to make any concessions or revise its policy. How-
ever, to bring about a genuine normalisation of relations with the 
West (especially the USA), Moscow would certainly have to make 
some limited concessions, including, as part of the Minsk Process, 
those concerning the conflict with Ukraine in Donbas (for exam-
ple, on the grounds of the initiatives put forward so far regarding 
the UN mission) and by beginning to respect anew some of the 
agreements concerning European security (as regards measures 
for building confidence and security) and possibly some new ini-
tiatives in this area also. Russia might, for example, make more 
specific the idea of package resolution of disputes regarding con-
ventional and nuclear weapons control. 
Moscow’s decisions will be affected by a number of factors, both 
external and internal. The most essential of these seem to be the 
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factors linked to the domestic situation in Russia, possible reshuf-
fles inside its government team and an evolution in the perception 
of the international and regional situation among the most senior 
Russian officials. Unless major alterations are made in these areas, 
a serious change in Russia’s present aggressive policy appears 
impossible. Apparently, only a serious domestic crisis in Russia 
that would entail a replacement of the government elite may offer 
any chance (albeit not a guarantee) for a positive – as viewed by 
the West – revision of Russian policy, including that concerning 
European security. 
In turn, if the Western community does not manage to maintain 
its unity based on common interests, standards and values, and 
especially in the case of further erosion – and even disintegra-
tion in extremis – of the trans-Atlantic bonds and the political and 
defence-based European and Euro-Atlantic structures (especially 
NATO), Russia, regardless of its relative weakness, may succeed 
in the longer term in achieving at least part of its present strategic 
goals in European security policy, which will be detrimental to 
Europe and to Russia itself. 
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